The option to terminate a manager early minimizes investor losses if he is unskilled. However, it also deters a skilled manager from undertaking long-term projects that risk low earnings. This paper demonstrates how risky debt can overcome this tension. Leverage concentrates equityholders'stakes, creating incentives for them to learn the cause of low earnings. If they result from investment (poor management), the …rm is continued (liquidated). Therefore, unskilled managers are terminated and skilled managers can invest without fear of termination. Unlike models of managerial discipline based on total payout, here dividends are not a substitute for debt -they achieve termination upon nonpayment, but not concentration, ex post monitoring and thus ex ante investment. Debt is dynamically consistent as the manager bene…ts from monitoring by a concentrated investor. In traditional theories, monitoring constrains the manager; here it frees him to take long-term projects, contrasting the standard intuition that debt reduces investment. The model derives implications for how capital structure and dividend policy depend on the relative severity of di¤erent agency problems.
Introduction
This paper studies the tension between two …rst-order problems faced by the modern …rm: how to terminate unskilled managers early, and how to induce skilled managers to pursue growth. The recent …nancial crisis demonstrates the substantial losses that can occur if misguided decisions are left unchecked. One key challenge for shareholders is to detect and halt such mistakes early. A quite separate challenge is how to incentivize managers to invest for the long-term. Nowadays, competitive success increasingly hinges upon intangible assets such as human capital (Zingales (2000) ). Since intangibles are invisible to outsiders in the short-term, managers concerned with interim performance may underinvest (Stein (1988) .)
These two challenges fundamentally con ‡ict. Investors can mitigate the value destroyed by an unskilled manager by forcing him to reveal short-term earnings, thus giving themselves the option to terminate him if pro…ts are low. However, the same termination threat may deter a skilled manager from undertaking e¢ cient long-term projects that risk low short-term earnings.
This paper demonstrates how risky debt can alleviate this tension, by playing two distinct roles which address the two separate challenges. The disciplinary e¤ect of debt addresses termination by forcing the manager to make an interim cash payment. The failure to do so reveals to investors that earnings are weak, the manager is likely unskilled, and thus termination might be desirable. Indeed, Jensen (1989) argues that this disciplinary e¤ect is a primary reason for why buyouts are typically levered: debt is "a mechanism to force managers to disgorge cash rather than spend it on empire-building projects."However, such a justi…cation for debt leaves many questions unanswered. First, dividends can also impose discipline: as Jensen also notes, "debt is a substitute for dividends." Second, buyouts typically feature a concentrated shareholder -but, if the key feature is the discipline imposed by debt, equityholders are irrelevant and dispersed ownership would be equally e¤ective. Third, it is the manager who controls leverage going forward, and he has incentives to raise equity to repay the debt and free himself from its discipline. Fourth, the disciplinary e¤ect may deter long-term investment. This is where the second e¤ect of debt comes in: the concentration e¤ect, which addresses investment. Our core model contains a single …rm, single large investor and a continuum of atomistic investors. If atomistic investors provide debt, the large investor's limited funds comprise a greater proportion of the total equity. Thus, a non-paying manager is not automatically …red; instead, the large investor's concentrated stake gives her an incentive to gather costly information on the underlying cause of weak earnings. If the cause is low managerial skill, the …rm is liquidated; if the cause is investment, it is continued. Knowing that investors will make an informed liquidation decision ex post, the manager pursues long-run growth ex ante. A skilled manager invests without fear of termination; an unskilled manager is e¢ ciently terminated.
The concentration e¤ect distinguishes this paper from prior theories on the disciplinary role of debt: it has di¤erent implications for the substitutability of dividends for debt, the e¤ect of debt on investment, the optimal level of debt, and the concurrence of risky debt with concentrated equity. In Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996) , debt also forces the manager to pay out cash. Dividends would have the same disciplinary e¤ect and are thus a perfect substitute: these models are theories of total payout (debt plus dividends) rather than debt in particular. Here, debt is critically di¤erent from dividends because the …nancing structure must not only allow termination (impose discipline), but also induce investment. The latter requires the concentration e¤ect, which only debt has. Turning to the e¤ect of debt, in Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) , debt reduces investment by lowering free cash. Here, debt can increase investment, since it encourages investors to monitor and thus become aware of the investment, inducing the manager to undertake it in the …rst place. Moving to the optimal level of debt, in a number of disciplinary models, the e¢ cient amount of debt is borderline nonrepayable. Since the only role of debt is to impose discipline, it should be just high enough that a bad type cannot pay it. In Lambrecht and Myers (2008) , strictly nonrepayable debt induces the manager to disinvest suboptimally quickly; here, it is e¢ cient as it increases concentration. Finally, the model predicts that leverage should coincide with concentrated equity investors who actively monitor, as documented empirically by Cotter and Peck (2001) .
The above predictions are primarily generated by the concentration e¤ect. Moreover, by analyzing two distinct and con ‡icting agency problems (liquidation and investment), the model studies the interaction between the concentration and disciplinary e¤ects together, which generates additional implications. These relate to the joint determinants of capital structure and dividend policy as a function of the relative severity of a …rm's agency issues. While standard empirical studies analyze the determinants of overall leverage (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995) ), this paper emphasizes that leverage is the product of two factors: the level of total payout (debt plus dividends) and the division of a given level of total payout between debt and dividends. The importance of short-term termination determines the need for the disciplinary e¤ect and thus the level of total payout. If termination is unlikely to be optimal (e.g. the …rm is a startup with low liquidation value), total payout should be low; indeed, such …rms are typically unlevered and pay no dividends. The importance of long-term investment determines the need for the concentration e¤ect and thus the composition of total payout. If growth opportunities are attractive, any payout should be in the form of debt. Along the cross section, while Rajan and Zingales …nd that leverage is negatively correlated with growth opportunities, the model predicts a positive correlation once total payout is controlled for. Rajan and Zingales's negative correlation suggests that a growing …rm prefers to be unlevered -but if termination is important, being unlevered is not an option. The appropriate comparison is debt versus other forms of payout that would achieve termination; debt is less detrimental to growth than dividends.
One application of the model is to leveraged buyouts, where debt is substantial and leads to a concentrated shareholder who actively monitors. LBOs are often undertaken to impose discipline on managers and force them to scrap ine¢ cient projects, but monitoring helps ensure that the requirement to make interim payments does not lead e¢ cient investment being cut. Indeed, Denis (1995) …nds that Kroger's recapitalization, where ownership remained dispersed, led to signi…cant reductions in capital expenditure. In contrast, in Safeway's LBO where KKR took a concentrated stake, debt was serviced mainly by asset sales. Similarly, Cotter and Peck (2001) …nd that LBOs perform more strongly if ownership is concentrated. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) show that, from the 1990s, buyouts have predominantly been in middle-aged …rms in industries such as IT/media/telecoms, …nancial services and healthcare, which likely have valuable growth opportunities. Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg (2010) …nd that LBOs lead to no decrease in innovation activity and an increase in the quality of innovation.
The above single-…rm model is analyzed in Section 2. Section 3 extends the model to multiple large investors and heterogeneous managers, where good managers have a higher probability of becoming inspired than bad types. A separating equilibrium is sustainable where bad managers run unlevered …rms …nanced exclusively by small shareholders, and good managers run levered …rms and are …nanced by both large and atomistic investors who earn abnormal returns. One interpretation of the latter is private equity; indeed, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) …nd that private equity investors enjoy superior returns.
The two roles of debt, which lead to …rm viability in a single-manager setting, also achieve separation in a multi-manager setting. The disciplinary e¤ect of debt renders it a credible signal of managerial quality: bad managers avoid leverage as they are likely to default. However, if only credibility of the signal mattered, borderline nonrepayable debt would be optimal -debt should be just high enough that a bad type defaults; additional debt would augment signaling costs. In addition, dividends would be equally credible as they also have a disciplinary e¤ect: indeed, Bhattacharya (1979) shows that the Ross (1977) idea of signaling value with debt can also be achieved with dividends.
However, credibility is not the only issue. The signal must be a desirable one that good managers wish to emit. In standard models, a good manager automatically wishes to reveal his quality, as his pay is exogenously assumed to depend on short-run value (Ross (1977) , Bhattacharya (1979) ) or signaling quality is necessary to raise …nancing (Myers and Majluf (1984) , Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) .) Here, pay is not tied to short-run value and even bad managers can raise …nancing, so the traditional motives to signal do not exist. This is where the concentration e¤ect comes in: it provides a motive to signal. This motive is not to obtain a greater level of funds, but to attract a di¤erent type of funds. Signaling quality attracts large investors. A large investor provides no more funds than several small investors, but is critically di¤erent as she has the incentive to monitor, thus allowing an inspired manager to take the long-term project. Since good managers have a greater probability of becoming inspired, this advantage is more important to them and separation is achieved.
The di¤erent motives for signaling lead to di¤erent results on the dynamic consistency of debt and the e¤ect of signaling on total surplus. In this and other models, debt hurts the manager owing to the disciplinary e¤ect, but he willingly bears these costs to signal quality. If the goal of signaling is to raise funds, it is already achieved in the …rst period. Hence, once funds have been raised, the manager has incentives to delever and free himself from discipline. This concern applies not only to signaling theories, but single-…rm models in which investors initially impose debt on the manager to solve free cash ‡ow problems (e.g. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) .) However, as noted by Zwiebel (1996) , it is the manager who controls leverage going forward, and he may subsequently reduce it to increase free cash.
Here, debt is dynamically consistent since its advantages are not con…ned to the …rst period, and so the manager has an incentive to retain it. Debt bene…ts the manager by inducing monitoring: this requires not only attracting a large investor through initially signaling quality, but also persuading her to monitor in the future by maintaining leverage. In short, the disciplinary e¤ect renders debt a credible signal in the …rst period. The concentration e¤ect renders it a desirable signal that the …rm wishes to maintain in future periods. This persistence of leverage in a given …rm is consistent with the …ndings of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) .
The manager's desire for monitoring in turn results from our analysis of a di¤erent agency problem to prior debt theories. In Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996) , there is a fundamental e¤ort con ‡ict where …rm value maximization requires the manager to exert e¤ort or forgo private bene…ts. Investors' role is thus to be an "adversary" of the manager, preventing shirking or private bene…ts. Monitoring hurts the manager, and so he wishes to delever to reduce investors' incentives to do so. Here, there is no e¤ort con ‡ict with respect to project selection: the long-term project maximizes both …rm value and private bene…ts. A monitor's role is to be an "ally" of the manager, allowing him to choose the project that he wishes to anyway in the absence of termination concerns. Since the monitor helps the manager, the latter has an incentive to retain the former through maintaining leverage. 1 Turning to welfare e¤ects, signaling reduces fundamental value in traditional models. In Ross (1977) , signaling leads to bankruptcy risk; in Stein (1988) and Miller and Rock (1985) it reduces investment. There are no o¤setting positive real e¤ects as separation merely changes outsiders'perceptions of short-run value. In Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) , signaling does have real bene…ts, because it allows a …rm to raise …nancing and thus invest. Here, the real bene…ts arise through a quite di¤erent mechanism. Signaling has no e¤ect on the level of funds raised: …rms receive the same as in a pooling equilibrium. Instead, the bene…t comes in the di¤erent type of funds. Signaling allocates scarce large investors to good managers, who bene…t most from monitoring as they are most likely to become inspired. In turn, monitoring improves investment.
Some features of this paper have been individually examined in prior models. By bringing together e¤ects studied in previously disparate literatures, this paper analyzes unexplored interactions (e.g. the con ‡ict between termination and investment, and the concentration e¤ect alleviating a side-e¤ect of the disciplinary e¤ect) and thus generates new insights unattainable from piecing together the individual results of prior research. In Boot and Thakor (1993) , as in this paper, leverage concentrates shareholders'…xed dollar wealth and induces monitoring. 1 Zwiebel (1996) also achieves dynamic consistency, through the di¤erent mechanism of an ever-present raider (an adversary). 2 In Boot and Thakor and the present paper, debt is valuable as it makes equity informationally sensitive and induces shareholders to monitor. By contrast, in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) , the desirability of debt arises because it is informationally insensitive and its owners have low incentives to monitor. Thus, uninformed investors wish to trade debt. Mahrt-Smith (2004) studies how institutional factors jointly a¤ect capital structure and ownership structure, rather than the how the former a¤ects the latter.
In their model, monitoring has no real e¤ects. While one could piece together their result with the literature on the e¤ect of blockholders on real decisions (e.g. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) ) and conclude that the concentration e¤ect can alleviate agency issues, this paper explicitly models two speci…c and con ‡icting agency problems to deliver new results. For example, applying the standard result that the blockholder exerts discipline (e.g. Burkart et al.) suggests the manager will unlever; here he wishes to retain the blockholder. In a model of investment alone, growth could simply be induced by giving the manager a long-term contract and so there is no need for concentration; this paper adds a termination problem to create endogenous short-term concerns for the manager and overturn the standard intuition that debt harms investment, when compared with other mechanisms that allow termination. Considering both problems allows us to break down debt into total payout (which depends on the termination issue) and its composition between debt and dividends (which depends on the investment issue), generating joint implications for capital structure and dividend policy.
The concentration e¤ect also echoes Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Innes (1990) , where debt magni…es a manager's equity holding, directly inducing e¤ort. 3 Here, there is no fundamental e¤ort con ‡ict, yet debt is still e¤ective. Leverage incentivizes e¤ort by investors rather than the manager, indirectly inducing him to choose the e¢ cient project. The model contains two layers of agency problems: investor monitoring and managerial investment; solving the former addresses the latter. 4 With a single problem of managerial investment, debt would not be a solution. Other papers contain a link between leverage and monitoring that does not arise through concentration. In Townsend (1979) , debt is optimal and veri…cation only occurs in bankruptcy, as in this model; his is a pure exchange economy with no real e¤ects. In Harris and Raviv (1990) , debt leads to monitoring because they exogenously assume that an audit occurs if and only if the …rm is bankrupt. In reality, investigations can occur at all times; we endogenize the monitoring decision. 5 Von Thadden (1995) shows how debt can exert discipline; dividends would have the same e¤ect. He also considers myopia and demonstrates that it can be alleviated by monitoring, which he assumes to be contractible. This paper demonstrates how debt can induce non-veri…able monitoring. In Gümbel and White (2007) , debt induces monitoring by shifting control to a "tough" investor, rather than by the concentration e¤ect. 6 As in von Thadden, the manager makes an e¤ort decision and the monitor is an adversary; here she is an ally, giving the manager a reason to retain her. Edmans (2009) also links concentrated ownership to ex post monitoring and thus ex ante investment. He assumes exogenous short-term concerns and that the blockholder's investment can always be increased if required and capital structure is irrelevant. Here, her funds are limited and monitoring is instead induced by debt. This method of increasing concentration has an important advantage: while the dollar investment is chosen by the blockholder, leverage is under the manager's control. Diamond (1991 Diamond ( , 1993 ) also considers the costs and bene…ts of short-term debt. As in this paper, short-term debt can lead to ine¢ cient liquidation, although not investment distortions as there is no project selection decision. The bene…t of short-term debt is that a high-quality borrower expects that positive information will freely appear, reducing the cost of re…nancing. In this paper, information is costly and debt has the di¤erent objective of inducing its production. Diamond (1984) does consider monitoring incentives; as in Edmans (2009) , monitoring is induced by increasing the dollar investment by the monitor rather than by capital structure. In addition, the monitor in Diamond is a creditor and motivated to monitor by the possibility of downside protection. Here, a key bene…t of monitoring is upside potential through growth opportunities, which is only enjoyed by the monitor if she is a shareholder. In Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) , an interim termination/continuation decision also depends on the realization of a public signal. In those models, the signal automatically appears; here it must be generated at a cost and so the …nancial structure must elicit monitoring. Cohn and Rajan (2010) also feature a concentrated outside investor whose governance role is to generate a public signal, rather than engage in direct intervention like an "adversary". None of the papers mentioned consider dividends as a potential alternative to debt.
Our modeling setup draws from Stein (2005) , who also analyzes the tension between liquidation and long-term decisions, within the context of arbitrageurs contemplating long-run convergence trades. This paper builds on Stein by adding leverage and a monitoring technology, to allow both issues to be solved simultaneously.
The Model
A penniless manager (M ) seeks …nancing of I dollars for a project. There exists a single large investor (L) who has funds of x, and a pool of atomistic investors with one dollar each, where 1 < x < I. In reality, L corresponds to an institutional investor such as a private equity fund or mutual fund, and the atomistic investors represent households. 7 There are four periods, summarized in Figure 1 . At t = 0, M raises x of funds from L and I x of funds from the atomistic investors. (It will become clear that any structure in which L invests less than x is weakly dominated, as her monitoring incentives are weaker.) M is restricted to issue the standard securities of debt and equity (in any combination); as we will show, this restriction is without loss of generality. As in an IPO, all equityholders pay the same price for their shares and all creditors pay the same price for their debt. F is the face value of debt raised; it matures at t = 2 and its market value D is determined to ensure all creditors break even. M can also promise a dividend at t = 2. Let P denote the total payment required at t = 2, which is the sum of the debt repayment F and the promised dividend. For brevity, we sometimes use the term "…nancing structure"to refer to M 's joint decisions of capital structure and dividend policy. At t = 1, with probability the manager is "inspired", i.e. obtains an investment idea. Whether he is inspired is private information. An inspired manager can invest in either a Risky (R) or Safe (S) investment project; the project choice is noncontractible. (We will sometimes refer to choosing R rather than S as "investing".) An uninspired manager has no good ideas and loses money over time. At t = 2 the …rm generates unobservable cash E (also referred to as "earnings.") If the …rm is liquidated at t = 2 it is worth V 2 E; if it is continued until t = 3 it is worth V 3 (also referred to as "fundamental value.") Note that V 3 is the …rm's total value accrued over its life -it is not incremental to E. V 2 is veri…able at t = 2 if the …rm is liquidated, and V 3 is veri…able at t = 3 if the …rm is still in existence. The manager is assumed to be essential for the …rm's continuation, so termination of the manager is equivalent to liquidation of the …rm; thus, these terms are used interchangeably.
As in Stein (2005) , equityholders capture the full surplus, so creditors break even and M 's objective function consists of private bene…ts, such as reputational concerns or utility from incumbency, which are increasing in both …rm value and his tenure. He earns b 2 if the …rm is terminated and b 3 in total if the …rm is continued, and his outside option is zero. Appendix B shows that the model's results also hold if M instead receives a fraction of the …rm's assets that increases in his tenure. The payo¤s are given below:
The parameters in Table 1 satisfy the following conditions:
(1) means that terminating an uninspired manager at t = 2 increases investor returns; (2) means it also increases total surplus. (3) demonstrates that R leads to a higher V 3 than S.
The disadvantage of R is that it has a probability of leading to the same low earnings as an uninspired manager at t = 2. We will sometimes refer to a manager who chooses R but delivers E = V U as "unlucky" or su¤ering "interim losses." (4) denotes that M prefers not to be terminated. (5) means that M 's incentives are aligned with investors if the …rm is allowed to continue until t = 3: the same project that maximizes …rm value (R) also maximizes M 's private bene…ts. This distinguishes the paper from models of the e¤ort con ‡ict, where actions that bene…t investors are intrinsically costly to managers. While E is unobservable directly, the above conditions mean that promising P > V U reveals E to investors: only …rms for which E = K S will be able to make the full repayment, so failure to pay reveals that E = V U . A required payment of P > V U thus has a disciplinary e¤ect.
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At t = 2, events proceed as follows. First, the level of E determines which claimholders (creditors, if there are any, or shareholders) are in control and have the right to choose whether to continue or liquidate the …rm. Creditors have control if E < F , else shareholders. Second, to guide the liquidation decision, any investor may choose to engage in monitoring at t = 2; the decision to monitor is unobservable. Monitoring costs the investor c and has a probability < 1 of success; as in Diamond (1984) , we assume no gains from duplicate monitoring. 9 If monitoring succeeds, it generates a publicly observable, unveri…able signal that is fully informative of V 3 .
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Formally, the public signal is N 2 V R ; V S ; V U ; ? , where N stands for "news." V i indicates that V 3 = V i and ? is the null signal that appears if no monitoring occurs, or monitoring occurs and is unsuccessful (w.p. 1 ). Third, the party in control takes the continuation/liquidation decision based on the signal N and the level of earnings E, if the latter has been revealed via 8 Since the maximum possible E is K S , we restrict the analysis to P K S and so for brevity do not include the condition P K S in the rest of the paper. 9 We assume that the cost is non-pecuniary (e.g. e¤ort expenditure or an opportunity cost). The model can easily be extended to allow c to be a …nancial cost, as in Boot and Thakor (1993) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) . In addition, investors cannot coordinate to share the monitoring costs. This assumption is standard in any model with multiple shareholders (see also, e.g., Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) , Maug (1998) , Kahn and Winton (1998), Bolton and von Thadden (1998)) -if perfect coordination is possible, shareholder structure is irrelevant. The results continue to hold if shareholders can coordinate but at a cost. The model can be easily extended to allow gains from duplicate monitoring; it would involve additional conditions to ensure that households will not monitor which would lengthen the analysis. 10 The nonveri…ability of the signal rules out contracts that directly reward L for producing a signal. The assumption that signals are observable but noncontractible is standard in the incomplete contracts literature (e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) .) It is likely di¢ cult to write into a contract what constitutes a good or bad signal, even though this will be evident ex post, since the number of possible such signals is likely to be very large. Once the signal is discovered, its nature (good or bad) is unambiguousfor example, monitoring could involve undertaking an independent analysis of a drug in progress or the quality of an existing product. Even if we allow the signal to be falsi…ed, the monitor has no incentives to do so since, given the signal, all parties agree on the termination decision. The model can be extended to signals that are only privately observable to the monitor. To ensure the monitor does not shirk and simply claim to have found a positive signal, she could write credit protection to credibly communicate a positive signal, communicate it via trading shares (see, e.g., Edmans (2009)), or there could be a cost of communicating the signal so that she will only do so if the signal is truly positive. The analysis assumes observable signals since our focus is information acquisition incentives; the credible communication of acquired information has been studied elsewhere.
P > V
U . Formally, she chooses action A : N E ! fT; Cg 11 where T involves terminating the manager and liquidating the …rm, and C involves continuing the …rm. If a signal is generated, all investors agree on the optimal decision -…rm value is maximized by liquidation upon N = V U and continuation upon N 2 V R ; V S ; since both debt and equity are non-decreasing in …rm value, this termination policy is followed regardless of who has control. When N = ? and so …rm value is uncertain, we will show that, under the optimal …nancing structure, the party in control will always take the …rst-best decision. Thus, the identity of the party in control does not matter. This deliberately distinguishes the model from Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Grinstein (2006) and Gümbel and White (2007) where the signal is not fully informative and so creditors may take the conservative action T even when it is ine¢ cient, because they have a concave claim in the …rm. Here, the driver of capital structure is monitoring incentives rather than control rights. In sum, if a signal is generated, it is su¢ cient to determine A and earnings do not matter; earnings only a¤ect A if there is no signal. Thus, the action function is either A (N ) or A (?; E). The timing of events is similar to Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) except that in those papers, the public signal automatically appears; here, it must be generated at a cost.
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The …rst-best solution involves an uninspired manager always being terminated at t = 2, and an inspired manager always choosing R at t = 1 and being continued at t = 2. To make the …nancing problem interesting, we need to impose two sets of parametric restrictions. The …rst ensures that the investment problem exists in the …rst place, i.e. a manager forced to make a high interim payment will myopically choose S, but can be cured by monitoring. It is clearer to introduce these assumptions later during the actual analysis, as the reader can more easily see their e¤ect. These will be conditions (10), (11) and (15) . The second ensures that the termination and investment problems are su¢ ciently severe that, if unsolved, the …rm is negative-NPV -i.e. the …rm is only viable if we achieve su¢ ciently close to …rst-best. These assumptions are as follows:
Condition (6) states that, if an inspired manager always chooses S, the …rm is unpro…table -even if investors obtain the maximum possible liquidation value of
Condition (7) states that, if an uninspired manager is never terminated, the …rm will not be pro…table -even if investors obtain the maximum possible terminal value of V R if M is inspired.
Thus, for the …rm to be …nanced, both the investment and termination issues must be (at least partially) solved. While we impose conditions (10), (11) and (15) throughout the paper, we will relax (6) and (7) in Section 2.4. The full optimization problem involves M choosing the amount of debt and equity to issue to both L and atomistic investors, the amount of dividends to promise and the level of monitoring for each investor to undertake, to maximize his private bene…ts subject to the participation constraint that all investors at least break even, and the incentive constraint that each investor's monitoring decision is incentive compatible. To highlight the importance of monitoring, and the role of debt in inducing non-contractible monitoring, we commence in Section 2.1 by analyzing a variant of the model in which monitoring is impossible and derive conditions under which the …rm is unviable, and thus the optimal …nancing structure must involve monitoring with positive probability. We assume contractible monitoring in Section 2.2 and show that the …rm is viable when monitoring occurs. In Section 2.1, the optimization problem does not involve M choosing each investor's level of monitoring nor monitoring incentive constraints; in Section 2.2, M chooses the monitoring level but there are no incentive constraints. Section 2.3 considers the core model with non-contractible monitoring and thus all constraints, and analyzes how to induce monitoring via the choice of …nancing structure. Section 2.4 compares total surplus under di¤erent …nancing structures. We use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) solution concept throughout: all players take the optimal actions given their beliefs about other players' actions, these beliefs are correct in equilibrium, and updated according to Bayes'rule.
No Monitoring
If there is no monitoring technology, the action A cannot depend on the signal N , but can depend on earnings E if they are revealed through a disciplinary payment of P > V U . Since there is no monitoring constraint in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, there is no role for debt and so we can assume that the payment P is entirely in the form of dividends without loss of generality.
We …rst consider the case where P V U so all …rms can make the payment. Since investors never learn E, M need not worry about it and can simply choose R if inspired. If
…rm value is maximized under continuation at t = 2. Since equity value equals …rm value, shareholders always take the e¢ cient termination decision that maximizes …rm value (in this case, continuation at t = 2), and so the termination decision is renegotiation-proof. 13 From (6) and V S > K U > K S , the right-hand side of (8) is less than I. Thus, for the remainder of the paper, we assume that (8) holds -if it did not hold, then the left-hand-side of (8) would be less than I and the …rm would not be viable, from (7) . Since the …rm is always continued, it is worth V R if M is inspired and V U otherwise.
Lemma 1 (No monitoring, no discipline). Assume that no monitoring occurs. In the subgame following the announcement of a non-disciplinary payment P V U , the unique PBE is the following: (i) If the …rm is …nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the …rm is …nanced, it is never liquidated at t = 2.
(iii) The …rm is not …nanced.
Proof Since the probability of termination is una¤ected by the manager's choice, part (i) follows automatically from (5). For part (ii), investors'beliefs are (1 ) that the manager has chosen R and E = V U , that the manager has chosen R and E = K S , and 1 that the manager is inspired. From (8), the …rm is continued. For part (iii), the expected gross return to investors is
From (7), investors make a loss, and therefore will not …nance the …rm to begin with. The problem with the above structure is that an uninspired manager is never terminated, since he is not forced to reveal his low earnings at t = 2. Since investors' participation constraint is violated, they will not …nance the …rm. A possible solution is for M to promise a disciplinary payment of P > V U . Since an uninspired manager cannot make such a payment, his low quality is revealed even without a monitoring technology, allowing e¢ cient liquidation. However, the disadvantage is that the high payment requirement may deter an inspired manager from choosing R since it risks yielding E = V U , in which case he cannot make the payment and may be viewed as uninspired. This leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 (No monitoring, discipline). Assume that no monitoring occurs and that the following two conditions hold:
In the subgame following the announcement of a disciplinary payment P > V U , the unique PBE is the following: (i) If the …rm is …nanced, the manager chooses S if inspired.
(ii) If the …rm is …nanced, it is liquidated at t = 2 if the payment is not met, otherwise it is continued.
(iii) The …rm is not …nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
Proof Let an inspired manager pursue a mixed strategy of R w.p. and S w.p. (1 ) . The posterior probability that a non-paying manager is inspired is 1 + . Investors will terminate the …rm if
which holds from (10). This proves part (ii). Given this, part (i) follows from (11). For part (iii), the expected gross return to investors is
From (6), investors make a loss, and therefore will not …nance the …rm to begin with. The intuition is as follows. The maximum posterior probability that a non-paying manager is inspired is 1 + . This probability is reached if an inspired manager always chooses R, otherwise the posterior is lower. Equation (10) means that investors prefer to terminate a nonpaying manager: even if the posterior probability that M is inspired is the highest possible, it is still insu¢ cient to outweigh the gains from early liquidation if M is uninspired. Equation (11) shows that an inspired manager myopically chooses S to avoid the risk of non-payment; by (6), the …rm is not viable if an inspired manager never chooses R. For the remainder of the paper, we assume that (10) (11) hold, else there is no myopia problem to begin with: an inspired manager nonchalantly chooses R.
Combining the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Firm unviable without monitoring.) In the absence of a monitoring technology, the …rm cannot be …nanced.
Proof Directly from Lemmas 1 and 2. The …rm cannot be …nanced without monitoring. If a low payment is promised, an inspired manager chooses R but an uninspired manager is never terminated. If a high payment is promised, an uninspired manager is terminated but an inspired manager chooses S. This is the tension between termination and investment, which is the heart of the paper.
The model has a close parallel to the case in which E is publicly observable and so there is no need for a disciplinary payment. The high-payment case of Lemma 2 corresponds to giving M a short-term contract which allows him to be …red at t = 2. This enables investors to terminate an uninspired manager, but deters an inspired manager from choosing R. The low-payment case of Lemma 1 corresponds to giving M a long-term contract which guarantees his employment until t = 3. This induces investment, but prevents termination if E = V U . Indeed, in standard myopia models (e.g. Stein (1988) ), the manager is exogenously assumed to place weight on interim earnings but the investment issue would be solved by a long-term contract; here such a solution is unworkable as there is also a termination issue. In both interpretations, the essence of myopia is information asymmetry: investors can only base their termination decisions on observable variables, and without monitoring they can only observe earnings E (either directly if it is public or indirectly via observing the payment) rather than fundamental value V 3 .
Contractible Monitoring
We now introduce a contractible monitoring technology. While we assume that monitoring is veri…able, we continue to assume that investors cannot observe whether M is inspired or which project he selects. This highlights the fact that eliciting monitoring is su¢ cient both to induce optimal project selection by an inspired manager and to overcome an uninspired manager's desire to continue -i.e. solving investors'moral hazard problem is su¢ cient to solve M 's. If M 's project choice and inspiration were observable, monitoring would be unnecessary as investors could just terminate a manager it knows to be uninspired and instruct an inspired manager to choose R. That the key e¤ort decision is at the investor level distinguishes the model from Jensen and Meckling (1976) , where debt is used to directly solve agency problems at the manager level.
Since L has the greatest stake in the …rm, she has the strongest incentive to monitor (which will become important in Section 2.3 when monitoring is non-contractible), so the analysis focuses on her being the monitor. If monitoring is successful, the e¢ cient action is given by
If monitoring is unsuccessful, there are four possible termination policies. The …rst is A (?) = C, i.e. the …rm is always continued. Since the termination decision does not depend on E, an inspired manager need not be concerned with E and so chooses R. If he is uninspired, with probability monitoring succeeds and investors terminate the …rm for K U ; else the …rm is continued and investors recover V U . The returns to all investors and the manager are given by:
A second option is A ?; V U = T , i.e. at t = 0 M has promised P > V U . Note that L does not need to monitor if the payment has been made as this reveals E = K U and thus A = C is optimal. If the payment is missed (which reveals E = V U ), monitoring occurs and the …rm is terminated if N 2 V U ; ? . Since the termination decision now depends on E, an inspired manager who chooses R risks termination if he is unlucky (w.p. ) and monitoring fails (w.p.
1
). Nevertheless, he still chooses R if
i.e. the gain in private bene…ts from pursuing R outweighs the risk of termination. The key di¤erence with (11), M 's incentive constraint without monitoring, is that he is only terminated with probability (1 ) rather than -even if he is unlucky, he is continued if monitoring is successful. Put di¤erently, monitoring means that (w.p. ) investors make the liquidation decision according to fundamental value rather than earnings. Therefore the manager chooses the project which maximizes fundamental value rather than earnings, i.e. R. We assume that (15) holds throughout the paper, otherwise monitoring becomes irrelevant as it cannot cure myopia. In sum, assumptions (10), (11) and (15) jointly mean that M acts myopically if and only if there is no monitoring. The returns to all investors and the manager are given by:
A third possibility is A (?) = T . As with A (?) = C, E is irrelevant for the termination decision so an inspired manager chooses R. However, from (8) , it is never e¢ cient to terminate a manager in the absence of a signal or earnings realization. A …nal possibility is A ?; V U = C (i.e. monitor if and only if a disciplinary payment is not met, and continue the …rm if monitoring is unsuccessful), but from (10) it is never e¢ cient to continue a loss-making manager in the absence of a signal. Thus, neither of these termination policies are renegotiation-proof. In sum, both A (?) = C or A ?; V U = T involve renegotiation-proof termination decisions.
Comparing (13) and (16), the di¤erence is that if monitoring fails, A ?; V U = T leads to the "Type I error" of ine¢ cient termination of an inspired but unlucky manager, and A (?) = C leads to the "Type II error" of ine¢ cient continuation of an uninspired manager. Note that (10) implies that (16) > (13). This is intuitive: (10) means it is optimal to shut down a lossmaking manager in the absence of a signal, and so Type II errors are more important than Type I errors. Thus, A ?; V U = T maximizes investor returns as it minimizes Type II errors.
However, since (14) > (17), M 's payo¤ is higher and so either A (?) = C or A ?; V U = T may be the …rst-best termination policy that maximizes total surplus (the sum of …rm value and private bene…ts).
14 If …rm value is relatively important, A ?; V U = T is …rst-best; if private bene…ts are relatively important, A (?) = C is …rst-best. (Note that, if investors'participation constraints can be satis…ed under A (?) = C, the manager will choose it since his private bene…ts are higher.) Since monitoring is contractible, there are no incentive constraints and only participation constraints. Let w ( ) be the payo¤ received by L for a given …rm value; we later show how to implement the payo¤ function w ( ) by the choice of capital structure. The following Lemmas summarize the two potential …rst-best termination policies.
Lemma 3 (Monitoring, no discipline). Assume that L always monitors. In the subgame following the announcement of a non-disciplinary payment P V U , the unique PBE is the following: (i) If the …rm is …nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the …rm is …nanced, it is liquidated at t = 2 if N = V U , otherwise it is continued.
14 The "e¢ cient termination decision"and the "…rst-best termination policy"are two separate concepts. The former is a t = 2 concept: after any payment, if promised, has been made or not made, and any signal has been realized, is it optimal to terminate or continue the …rm? The latter is a t = 0 concept that also studies whether it is optimal to demand a payment in the …rst place (and thus make the termination decision depend on it), i.e. compares returns across the cases where a payment is promised and a payment is not promised. An additional di¤erence is the …rst-best termination policy maximizes total surplus, whereas the e¢ cient termination decision maximizes investor returns alone since it is concerned with renegotiation proofness (see also footnote 11).
(iii) If the …rm is …nanced, the expected gross returns to L and all households are, respectively:
If (18) x and (19) I x, the …rm is …nanced and the manager's payo¤ is
Proof Part (i) is as in Lemma 1. For part (ii), the optimal A is automatic for N 6 = ?. For N = ?, A = C from (8) . Part (iii) follows from simple calculations.
Lemma 4 (Monitoring, discipline). Consider the subgame following the announcement of a disciplinary payment P > V U and assume that L monitors if the payment is not met. The unique PBE is the following: (i) If the …rm is …nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the …rm is …nanced, it is liquidated at t = 2 if both the payment is not met and
If (21) x and (22) I x, the …rm is …nanced and the manager's payo¤ is
Proof Part (i) is as in Lemma 2. For part (ii), the optimal A is automatic for N 6 = ?. For N = ?, A = T from (10). Part (iii) follows from simple calculations.
Non-Contractible Monitoring
We now move to the core case of non-contractible monitoring. The previous two sub-sections have shown that the …rm is viable only if monitoring occurs, so we focus on how to induce voluntary monitoring by L. We consider the two potential …rst-best termination policies in turn. A (?) = C corresponds to P V U , in which case L's incentive constraint is:
Since the default decision is continuation, a signal is only valuable if it leads to termination, i.e. delivers N = V U . This occurs if the manager is uninspired (w.p. (1 )) and monitoring is successful (w.p. .) E¢ cient termination augments L's payo¤ by w K U w V U .
A ?; V U = T corresponds to P > V U , in which case L monitors at t = 2 if and only if the payment is missed. The incentive constraint is now:
The posterior probability that a non-paying manager is inspired is 1 + , in which case successful monitoring leads to e¢ cient continuation and so L's payo¤ rises by w V
In either case, L's payo¤ w ( ) must be su¢ ciently sensitive to …rm value for monitoring to be incentive compatible. Since w ( ) can only take on two values in either case, regardless of which termination policy we wish to implement, it is su¢ cient to consider linear schemes that satisfy limited liability. Such a scheme has the general form w (z) = max (gz + h; 0). Since a positive h increases w K U , w V U and w V R equally, it has no e¤ect on monitoring incentives and so we can consider only non-positive h. The payo¤ function w (z) = max (gz + h; 0) for h 0 can be implemented by issuing debt with face value h=g and giving L equity. Without loss of generality, we can thus the analysis to M issuing only the standard securities of debt and equity, and L holding equity. L thus has an equity stake of
. In the presence of multiple claims (debt and equity) it is not automatic that the party in control will take the e¢ cient termination decision when N = ?, so we must verify that the termination decision is e¢ cient (so that there is no scope for renegotiation) in addition to L's monitoring incentives.
Termination policy A (?) = C involves P V U and thus can be implemented with debt of F V U ; since the payment is non-disciplinary, there is no role for dividends. Termination policy A ?; V U = T can be implemented by two methods. The …rst is issuing risky debt of
There is no role for dividends, since risky debt already achieves a disciplinary e¤ect.
The second is a combination of debt and dividends that creates a total required payment P > V U . This latter includes the case of V U < F K U : while debt of F > V U is risky to the manager since he cannot repay it if he delivers E = V U , it is not risky to creditors if F K U , since they can recover K U in a liquidation. We thus use the terms "riskless"and "risky"debt to denote the cases of F K U and F > K U , and "repayable" and "nonrepayable" debt to denote the cases of F V U and F > V U . We consider these three cases in turn.
Risky Debt
We …rst consider F > K U . Creditors have control if E = V U . If N = ?, they liquidate the
This holds as a direct consequence of (10); (10) also means that liquidation is e¢ cient. 15 We now consider whether L will gather information. With risky debt and L owning equity,
L's monitoring incentives are maximized when w K U is at its lowest possible value of 0; this is achieved by having risky debt of at least K U . Then, the incentive constraint (25) becomes
The left-hand side of (27) contains the term
. We denote the positive e¤ect of F on x I D and thus monitoring incentives as the concentration e¤ect. (We will shortly derive conditions on F to ensure that (27) is satis…ed).
With incentive-compatible monitoring and e¢ cient termination under a disciplinary payment, the equilibrium is similar to Lemma 4 and given as follows:
Lemma 5 (Risky debt, no dividends.) Assume that (27) holds. In the subgame in which there is risky debt of F > K U and no dividends, the following is a PBE:
(i) If the …rm is …nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the …rm is …nanced and the payment is met, L does not monitor at t = 2. If the payment is not met, L monitors. If N 2 V R ; V S , the …rm is continued, otherwise it is liquidated. If the payment is not met and L does not monitor, the …rm is liquidated.
(iii) The expected gross returns to L and all other shareholders are, respectively:
If (28) x, the …rm is …nanced and the manager's payo¤ is
else the …rm is not …nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
(iv) If the …rm is …nanced, the market value of debt is given by
15 (10) also means that, even if we introduce new players into the model (potential new investors at t = 2), the manager cannot continue by raising external funds -since the …rm is now negative-NPV, no investor will …nance it. A outside investor also has no incentive to pay c to decide whether to inject equity. The core model assumes public signals and so a non-investor can never pro…t from monitoring. Here we consider private signals. If the signal is bad, she will not invest and thus loses c overall. If the signal is good, she will try to inject equity but the …rm will infer the good signal and price equity so that she gets zero return on the injection, and again loses c overall. If we assume that new investors have bargaining power and can pro…t from an equity injection, the results of the model still go through -debt is bene…cial as it means that new investors are able to obtain concentrated stakes, increasing their pro…t from investing on a good signal and thus their monitoring incentives.
Proof 28) x implies (29) > I D x, (28) x is su¢ cient for all shareholders'participation constraints to be satis…ed and so the …rm to be …nanced.
The lower bound to F is the minimum debt level that allows (27) to be satis…ed. Substituting (31) into (27) de…nes the lower bound as:
The upper bound to F is given by substituting (31) into D = I x, i.e.
Therefore, if
then monitoring can be induced under risky debt. If (34) is violated, the monitoring technology is su¢ ciently ine¤ective that, even if L holds the …rm's entire equity, she still does not monitor. The power of risky debt comes from two e¤ects. The …rst is the disciplinary e¤ect. Debt forces the …rm to pay out cash. Since uninspired managers cannot meet the payout requirement, they are e¢ ciently terminated. However, the disciplinary e¤ect has the potential disadvantage of deterring inspired managers from choosing R. This is where the second role of risky debt comes in: the concentration e¤ect. Leverage increases L's equity stake and thus her monitoring incentives: mathematically, a rise in F augments D (from (31)) and thus (27) . Note that there is a countervailing e¤ect: an increase in F reduces shareholders' bene…ts from e¢ cient continuation of an unlucky manager, which are V R F . This is because creditors receive F K U from e¢ cient continuation, and therefore capture more of the gains. This is an example of the Myers (1977) "debt overhang" e¤ect. Combining the two e¤ects, a rise in F reduces the total gains to all shareholders from e¢ cient continuation, but gives L a greater proportion of these equity gains. The overall e¤ect of increasing F on L's incentives is given by di¤erentiating the left-hand side of (27) to yield:
If the …rm is viable (i.e. (28) x holds), we have (29) > I D x which implies (35) > 0, i.e. the concentration e¤ect of debt outweighs the debt overhang e¤ect. Put di¤erently, the …rm is viable under risky debt only if the net bene…ts of debt are positive, as is intuitive.
Repayable Debt and No Dividends
We now turn to the case of repayable debt of D = F V U . Since shareholders always have control, and repayable debt simply reduces their payo¤ in all cases by F , it has no e¤ect on their termination decision and the e¢ cient termination decision is always implemented. We …rst assume no dividends, so P = F V U and all …rms can make the payment. This corresponds to policy A (?) = C, where an inspired manager chooses R and the …rm is continued if N = ?.
F so the monitoring constraint (24) becomes:
If (36) is satis…ed, then L always monitors. Hence, repayable debt achieves both (occasional) liquidation and investment. The equilibrium is the following analog of Lemma 3:
Lemma 6 (Repayable debt, no dividends.) Assume that (36) holds. In the subgame in which there is repayable debt of F V U and no dividends, the unique PBE is the following:
(ii) If the …rm is …nanced, L monitors at t = 2. If N = V U , the …rm is liquidated, otherwise it is continued. If L does not monitor, the …rm is continued.
(iii) If the …rm is …nanced, the expected gross returns to L and all other shareholders are, respectively:
else the …rm is not …nanced and all payo¤s are zero. If (37) x, the …rm is …nanced and the manager's payo¤ is:
Proof Parts (i) and (ii) are as in Lemma 3. Part (iii) follows from simple calculations. Since (37) x implies (38) > I D x, (28) x is su¢ cient for all shareholders' participation constraints to be satis…ed and so the …rm to be …nanced.
It may not be possible to satisfy (36) with repayable debt. L's monitoring incentives are maximized when F is at its highest possible repayable value of V U . Indeed, from the general incentive constraint (24), L's monitoring incentives are maximized when w V U is at its lowest possible value of 0; since L holds equity, this is achieved by having debt of V U . Thus, if
then L will not monitor under repayable debt. The equilibrium is as in the no-monitoring, lowpayment case (Lemma 1); the …rm is unviable since an uninspired manager is never terminated. (40) is likely to be satis…ed when I is large compared to x (L's funds fall signi…cantly short of the total needed to …nance the …rm) and V U is small (repayable debt capacity is low).
Repayable debt has a concentration e¤ect, but no disciplinary e¤ect and thus su¤ers two drawbacks. First, in the absence of discipline, the default decision is to continue the …rm, and so the gains from monitoring are the savings from e¢ cient liquidation, K U V U . In contrast, the disciplinary e¤ect of risky debt changes the default decision to liquidation. Therefore, the incentive to monitor depends on the gains from continuation, V R F . This may be signi…cantly is unable to learn E and must pay the monitoring cost in all states. Thus, the participation constraint (37) x may be violated. The disciplinary e¤ect of risky debt reveals E without cost: if the …rm meets its debt repayment, L knows that E = K S and so does not need to monitor. This echoes Townsend (1979) , where veri…cation only occurs in bankruptcy.
Riskless Debt and Dividends
The two weaknesses of repayable debt can be addressed by increasing P above V U in one of two ways: either increasing F to between V U and K U so that it becomes nonrepayable (but stays riskless), or combining it with a dividend promise exceeding V U F , so that P > V U .
The combination of riskless debt and a dividend leads to a disciplinary e¤ect and addresses both of the above issues. If F V U (i.e. the discipline comes from dividends), shareholders have control if E = V U and always take the e¢ cient termination decision as in Section 2.3.2.
If F > V U , creditors have control if E = K S and liquidate if (26) holds, which is e¢ cient as in Section 2.3.1. We have w V R =
Lemma 7 (Riskless debt, dividends.) Assume that (41) holds. In the subgame in which there is riskless debt of F K U and dividends so that P > K U , the strategy pro…le in Lemma 5 is a PBE.
If (41) is satis…ed, riskless debt and dividends have the same e¤ect as risky debt. However, it may not be possible to satisfy (41) with riskless debt. L's monitoring incentives are maximized when F is at its highest possible riskless value of K U . Thus, if
then insu¢ cient concentration is achieved under riskless debt. The equilibrium is as in the nomonitoring, high-payment case (Lemma 2), and the …rm is unviable since an inspired manager chooses S. Using the results of Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Assume that (34), (40) and (42) hold, and that (28) > x. The …rm cannot be …nanced with pure equity or riskless debt, but can be …nanced by risky debt.
Proof See Lemmas 5, 6 and 7. The Appendix proves that the set of parameters that satis…es these conditions is non-empty. If the conditions in Proposition 1 are satis…ed, both e¤ects of risky debt are necessary for the …rm to be viable. Like debt, dividends also impose discipline: indeed, in a number of theories of debt (e.g. Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) , Zwiebel (1996) ), the only purpose of debt is to force payout of cash and so dividends are a substitute. Similarly, in the dividend model of Myers (2000) , the manager must pay out cash in the form of dividends to prevent diversion and is terminated if he misses a payment; debt would have the same e¤ect. Here, allowing liquidation is not the only objective. Dividends (or a combination of dividends and riskless debt) are not a satisfactory substitute for risky debt because they do not achieve su¢ cient concentration, and thus have the side-e¤ect of deterring investment.
Gümbel and White (2007) were the …rst to note that debt increases shareholders'incentives to monitor because it shifts control to creditors and thus changes the default decision to liquidation. In their setting, there is no concentration e¤ect because a shareholder has unlimited funds, and only the disciplinary e¤ect matters. Therefore, the optimal level of debt is borderline nonrepayable: F is just above V U , i.e. just su¢ cient to shift control to creditors. Similarly, in many other settings in which debt exerts discipline, borderline nonrepayable debt is also strictly optimal: for example, in Lambrecht and Myers (2008) , strictly nonrepayable debt would induce the manager to disinvest suboptimally quickly. Here, the concentration e¤ect is also important, and so the optimal debt level is strictly nonrepayable.
Comparison of Financing Structures
Thus far, we have assumed that both the termination and investment problems need to be simultaneously solved for the …rm to be viable (assumptions (6) and (7)), and so monitoring is crucial. Combined with (34), (40) and (42), only risky debt achieves su¢ cient concentration to induce monitoring. However, in other settings, one of the agency problems may be relatively unimportant, and so it may be possible to …nance the …rm even if it is not solved. In such a case, other …nancing structures become feasible and may dominate the levered …rm. This subsection relaxes assumptions (6) and (7), so that the non-monitoring equilibria of Lemmas 1 and 2 may now become viable, and condition (40) so that monitoring may be feasible under repayable debt, allowing the equilibrium of Lemma 3 to hold. (We do not separately consider the case of riskless debt plus a dividend because, if monitoring is incentive compatible, it leads to the same outcome as risky debt.) The four equilibria in Lemmas 1-4 can be implemented by the following capital structures given in Table 2 : While the previous section compared the mechanics of the four structures, here we compare their payo¤s, to generate empirical predictions for how capital structure and dividend policy depend on the relative severity of the …rm's agency problems. From Lemmas 1-4, total surplus (investor returns plus manager's private bene…ts, gross of the initial investment I) under each structure are given by 16 :
U nlevered, Dividend (DIV ) :
Repayable Debt (REP AY ABLE) :
The relative surplus depends on a number of terms. (K U V U ) re ‡ects the magnitude of the termination issue: if it is high, there are signi…cant savings from terminating an uninspired manager. It will be high if the …rm has tangible assets that can be eroded by an uninspired manager -for example, free cash that could be wasted on ine¢ cient investment, or non-core assets which would decline in value if not sold. If the …rm has predominantly intangible assets, liquidation value is low even with early termination, and so there are few gains from e¢ cient liquidation. (V R V S ) re ‡ects the magnitude of the investment issue: if it is high (e.g. the …rm has signi…cant growth opportunities), there is signi…cant value creation from inducing an inspired manager to take the risky project. re ‡ects the manager's quality. If it is low, the manager is likely uninspired and so termination becomes important. The ratio of to c re ‡ects the e¤ectiveness of monitoring. b S are high), RISKY maximizes investor returns and may indeed be the only viable …nancing structure. This is likely the case in middle-aged …rms. Such …rms have growth opportunities, but also abundant tangible assets that could be wasted under ine¢ cient continuation. The model thus provides a justi…cation of risky debt for public …rms with both growth opportunities and tangible assets. Another potential application is to LBOs, where substantial leverage leads to concentrated outside equity. Jensen (1989) highlights that one advantage of leverage is that it forces "managers to disgorge cash rather than spend it on empire-building projects."However, if only the disciplinary e¤ect is important, then dividends would be equally e¤ective, borderline nonrepayable debt would be optimal, and there would be no role for shareholder monitoring so ownership concentration is unimportant. Here, the concentration e¤ect is also important and thus debt is not a substitute for dividends, strictly nonrepayable debt is e¢ cient, and large shareholders actively monitor. If high leverage coincides with dispersed ownership, there is no monitoring and so the requirement to make debt repayments will induce myopia. 17 Indeed, Cotter and Peck (2001) …nd that concentrated private equity investors engage in active monitoring, and LBOs perform more strongly if ownership is concentrated. Denis (1995) compares the recapitalization of Kroger with the LBO of Safeway. In both cases, the debt-to-value ratio jumped to over 90%, but outside ownership remained dispersed at the former whereas the LBO sponsor (KKR) obtained a concentrated stake in the latter. Both …rms generated cash to service its debt load, consistent with the disciplinary e¤ect of debt, but Kroger achieved this primarily by cutting capital expenditures whereas Safeway sold non-core assets. Denis does not study the quality of investment (which is typically hard to measure); if at least some of the projects scrapped at Kroger were positive-NPV, this result is consistent with the model's predictions that debt combined with active equity monitoring imposes discipline but without leading to short-term behavior. While LBOs in the 1980s were in mature …rms in old economy industries and predominantly driven by the desire to curb ine¢ cient investment, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) show that, from the 1990s, buyouts have predominantly been in middle-aged …rms in industries such as IT/media/telecoms, …nancial services and healthcare. Such …rms likely have growth opportunities, and so LBOs have the twin objectives of curbing wasteful expenditure without deterring e¢ cient projects. Indeed, it might seem that a better way to cut ine¢ cient investment would be to ask the manager to pay high dividends, which would save on the transaction costs of an LBO. However, the former might deter e¢ cient investment. Kaplan (1989) …nds that investment in general declines after an LBO but value increases, which suggests that it is ine¢ cient projects that are being cut. Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg (2010) …nd that innovation as measured by patenting activity does not decline and patent quality as measured by citations increases, which implies that e¢ cient investment is not harmed.
Investment, but not termination, is an important issue in two main types of …rm. First, a start-up has high growth opportunities and thus a large payo¤ V R V S from taking the e¢ cient project. On the other hand, the savings from e¢ cient termination (K U V U ) are low for two reasons: it has few tangible assets and so little is recovered in a liquidation, even if it comes early (both K U and V U are low), and it has low free cash so an uninspired manager that is allowed to continue will not reduce …rm value signi…cantly. Second, if the manager is talented ( is high), it is unlikely that termination is optimal. From (43) (46) , N ODIV and REP AY ABLE lead to the greatest investor returns. When investment is important, it is critical to achieve V R with the highest probability. These structures achieve this because they never terminate an inspired manager that pursues R, even if he becomes unlucky (i.e. they minimize Type I errors). The disadvantage is that they do not terminate an uninspired manager with certainty, but Type II errors are unimportant if the termination issue is small. Indeed, start-ups are typically unlevered and pay few dividends. We now compare N ODIV and REP AY ABLE. The latter dominates if (45) > (43), i.e.
For REP AY ABLE to be feasible, we must have (36) so that L has an incentive to monitor. Since F < I x, (36) implies c < (1 ) K U V U . Therefore, if the monitoring technology is su¢ ciently e¤ective for repayable debt to be feasible, it always increases investor returns. However, it reduces M 's payo¤ as he is sometimes terminated, so either may maximize total surplus. In contrast, if (36) is violated, there is no monitoring under repayable debt, so it leads to the same outcome as the unlevered …rm with no dividends. Indeed, N ODIV is a special case of REP AY ABLE where F = 0. The …nal case is where termination is important, but investment is less so. This is likely the case in a mature …rm with few growth opportunities and signi…cant free cash ‡ow that could be wasted by an uninspired manager, or if managerial quality is low. In such a …rm, DIV and RISKY achieve the highest investor payo¤s, because they terminate an uninspired manager with certainty. Comparing these two structures, dividends dominate debt if (44) > (46), i.e.
For the risky structure to be feasible, we must have (27) so that L has an incentive to monitor. This condition is consistent with (1
investor returns being higher under DIV . Thus, even though M 's payo¤ is lower (from (15)), total surplus may be higher. Previously we showed that, if REP AY ABLE is feasible (i.e. (36) is satis…ed), investor returns are always higher than under N ODIV . Here, even if RISKY is feasible (i.e. (27) is satis…ed), investor returns can still be inferior to DIV . The intuition is as follows. If is su¢ ciently high, investors would like to dissuade M from pursuing R if inspired, because it runs the risk of ine¢ cient termination if monitoring is unsuccessful. Since V R is low (investment is unimportant), this disadvantage is not outweighed by the upside of R. L can dissuade M from pursuing R by committing not to monitor if earnings are low. However, the decision to monitor only takes place once low earnings have been realized, and so does not depend on (see (27) ): only a¤ects the possibility that low earnings are realized in the …rst place. Thus, even if is high (so that L wishes an inspired manager to choose S at t = 1), she may still monitor once losses have occurred at t = 2. Since M expects to be monitored, he selects R, even if it is ine¢ cient. If the disciplinary payout at t = 2 is via dividends rather than debt, the concentration e¤ect is avoided and L can commit not to monitor.
Discussion and Empirical Implications
The N ODIV and REP AY ABLE structures considered above involve little payout, DIV involves a high payout in the form of dividends, and RISKY involves a high payout in the form of debt. Thus, while most existing research focuses on the factors a¤ecting total debt, the above analysis suggests that total debt should be decomposed into two components: the level of total payout P (debt plus dividends) and the composition of a given level of total payout between debt and dividends, F P
. We have:
where T otal P ayout = Debt + Dividends:
In turn, the two components of debt depend on the importance of the disciplinary and concentration e¤ects, and thus the two agency problems. The severity of the termination issue determines the importance of the disciplinary e¤ect, and thus the optimal level of total payout. For …rms in which early termination is unlikely to be optimal (e.g. start-ups), there is no need to discipline the manager -requiring a payment would merely induce myopia. Therefore, both debt and dividends should be low, as is the case empirically.
The severity of the investment issue determines the importance of the concentration e¤ect, and thus the optimal composition of a given level of total payout. If the termination issue is important and an interim payout is required, it should be in the form of debt rather than dividends if long-run growth is critical. This has both cross-sectional and time-series implications. With regards to the cross-section, …rms with more growth opportunities should feature debt rather than dividends. The positive association between growth opportunities and debt appears to contradict existing theory (Myers (1977) ) and evidence (Rajan and Zingales (1995) ). Those papers argue that debt is detrimental to growth, and so a growing …rm would prefer to be unlevered rather than levered. However, if the termination issue is important, then being unlevered is not an option. The appropriate comparison is debt versus other forms of payout that would achieve termination; debt is less detrimental to growth than these other solutions. Rajan and Zingales study debt in isolation (F ) rather than in conjunction with dividends: while they show that growth …rms use less debt, the model predicts that this relationship is overturned once total payout P is controlled for, or equivalently when studying F P instead of F . The time-series implication is that changes in the relative severity of the two agency problems within a …rm should drive changes in capital structure and dividend policy. For a start-up, ine¢ cient continuation is a minor issue and so total payout should be zero. As it matures, payout is necessary to address the termination issue; the model predicts that …rms should start issuing debt before they commence paying dividends.
In addition to the determinants of debt, the model also makes predictions on its e¤ects. Compared to the counterfactual of paying out the equivalent amount of dividends, debt increases the level of investment, by changing it from short-term to long-term projects. This contrasts the standard intuition that debt reduces investment -as explained above, if the termination issue is important, debt should be compared to dividends rather than the case of no debt.
We …nally discuss whether other securities can play the role of debt in the model. Preferred equity also has a disciplinary e¤ect since preferred shareholders are promised a dividend, and a concentration e¤ect since it does not dilute ordinary shareholders. Thus, the model can also be applied as a theory of preferred equity. Heinkel and Zechner (1990) is the only other theory of preferred equity of which we are aware 18 , which is based on the ‡exibility a¤orded by the ability to defer preferred dividends, rather than the concentration and disciplinary e¤ects. In contrast, repurchases are not a substitute for debt. The manager could promise to repurchase at least V U dollars of shares at t = 2, leading to a disciplinary e¤ect. However, repurchases do not generate the concentration e¤ect when it is needed. The manager is able to repurchase shares if
which concentrates L's stake, but this is of little use since monitoring is unnecessary in this state. In contrast, if E = V U , the manager cannot execute the full repurchase. Thus, full concentration is not achieved, precisely when monitoring is necessary.
3 Heterogeneous Managers
Analysis
This section extends the model to a setting of heterogeneous managers and multiple large investors. There now exist two manager types. There are n good managers (type G) who have a probability G of becoming inspired, and a continuum of bad managers (type B) who have a probability B of becoming inspired, where B < < G . The manager's type is private information. In addition, there are n large investors. 19 We now allow bankruptcy to be personally costly to the manager. In the core model, a manager who is unable to pay debt is just as likely to be …red as a manager who misses a dividend. In reality, …ring is likelier in a bankruptcy because the "default" decision (in the absence of further information) is liquidation; in solvency, the "default"decision is continuation and it requires an active decision by shareholders to close the …rm. For example, Zwiebel (1996) assumes that managers are replaced in bankruptcy with certainty if termination is e¢ cient, but shareholders face a cost of …ring a manager in solvency due to entrenchment. Myers (2000) assumes that shareholders face costs of collective action in liquidating a solvent …rm. We model such costs by specifying that, if liquidation is optimal for creditors, it occurs with certainty, but if liquidation is optimal for shareholders, it occurs only with probability < 1. Section 2 assumed that = 1, i.e. the disciplinary e¤ect of dividends and debt are the same; with < 1, the results of Section 2 would be stronger -risky debt would be even more preferred because it has a greater disciplinary e¤ect. Failure to meet a debt obligation bankrupts the …rm and changes the default decision to liquidation. 20 All of the results in this section continue to hold with = 1 if we instead assume that M su¤ers an additional reputational loss of y from his …rm being bankrupt: being …red because a …rm is bankrupt damages M 's reputation more than being …red from a solvent …rm. We only require that M wishes to avoid bankruptcy -either because …ring is more common ( < 1) or more painful (y > 0). We continue to relax (6) and (7) and instead make the following assumptions:
(49) states that a …rm run by a bad manager breaks even if M pursues S if inspired and is …red with probability if uninspired. Thus an unlevered …rm which requires dividends of V U is borderline viable. If the left-hand side was less than I, managers known to be bad would never be funded and so a separating equilibrium cannot exist. In reality, the pricing of physical capital will adjust so that bad managers will generate zero NPV -for example, if bad managers were unable to raise …nancing, demand for physical capital would drop, causing its price I to fall. Assumption (50) means that, if a bad manager runs an unlevered …rm and is never …red, the …rm is unviable. By (51), even if a good manager can signal his quality and all good managers who become inspired choose R, investors prefer to terminate a loss-making manager if N = ?. 21 If (51) does not hold, signaling high quality would automatically solve myopia: a good manager is not …red if E = V U , and so he can choose R if he becomes inspired.
Proposition 2 gives conditions under which a separating equilibrium is feasible.
Proposition 2 Assume that the following conditions hold: 20 Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) identify a similar reason why debt imposes greater discipline than dividends. Under certain parameter values, equityholders will not …re the manager if he fails to pay dividends as they have a convex claim; therefore, it is necessary to shift control to the creditor. In this paper, as in Myers (2000) , equityholders do wish to …re the manager upon poor performance, which is the essence of the myopia issue. 21 If creditors have control, they will terminate if
and (51).
A separating equilibrium is sustainable in which: (i) Good managers are …nanced with D of risky debt, x of equity from L, and I D x of equity from atomistic investors. If the manager becomes inspired, he chooses R. If the payment is not met, L monitors at t = 2. If N 2 V R ; V S , the …rm is continued, otherwise it is liquidated. If L does not monitor, the …rm is liquidated. The gross returns to investors and the manager are given by
(ii) Bad managers are …nanced with equity from atomistic investors and promise a dividend exceeding V U . If the manager becomes inspired, he chooses S. No monitoring occurs at t = 2.
If the dividend payment is met, the …rm is continued, otherwise it is liquidated with probability . The net returns to each atomistic investor are zero and M 's payo¤ is given by
(iii) Investors have the o¤-equilibrium path belief that a manager who establishes any other structure is bad.
Since G > B , conditions (52) and (53) can simultaneously be satis…ed. The …rst (second) condition ensures that G (B) does not deviate. L will monitor at t = 2 if
which determines the lower bound on F . From G > and (34), (57) can always be satis…ed. In the analysis of Section 2, the disciplinary and concentration e¤ects allowed the …rm to be viable under risky debt. Here, the same two e¤ects allow a separating equilibrium to be viable: the disciplinary e¤ect means that debt is a credible signal of managerial quality, and the concentration e¤ect renders it a desirable signal which good managers are willing to emit.
First, < 1 means that an uninspired manager in an unlevered …rm is only occasionally …red, whereas an uninspired manager in a levered …rm is de…nitely shut down. Debt therefore imposes stronger discipline than dividends. As in Ross (1977) , this renders it particularly costly to bad managers, as they are more likely to be uninspired, and so taking on leverage can credibly signal managerial quality.
Second, good managers desire to signal as they bene…t from revealing their quality -but the gains from signaling are quite di¤erent from standard signaling theories. In traditional models, the manager immediately bene…ts from revealing his quality: in Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya (1979) the signal leads to a higher stock price, to which his compensation is tied; in Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) , signaling high quality is necessary to raise funds. Here, managers are not paid according to the …rm's market value and do not bene…t from receiving a greater level of funds, since all managers are …nanced and receive I. Even if a manager is revealed bad, he can still raise funds as the pricing of funds adjusts to re ‡ect his low quality; such pricing does not a¤ect his payo¤ as he receives only private bene…ts. We deliberately assume a constant investment scale of I and that the manager only receives private bene…ts so that the traditional motives to signal do not apply. Despite this, good managers do have an incentive to signal due to the concentration e¤ect. Here, the bene…t of signaling manifests solely in the type of funds. By revealing his quality, a good manager attracts scarce large investors. One large investor provides no more funds than multiple small investors, but is critically di¤erent as she has the incentive to monitor. Monitoring is bene…cial because it allows inspired managers to pursue risky projects; this bene…t is particularly large for good managers, since they are most likely to become inspired. In sum, the bene…ts of leverage are highest for type G and the costs are highest for type B, so separation is achieved.
The di¤erence in the incentives to signal leads to dynamic consistency of leverage. Zwiebel (1996) notes that some theories of debt are "setup models", where high debt is only possible when the …rm is initially set up. The manager dislikes the disciplinary e¤ect of debt; thus, in Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) , the manager does not adopt debt voluntarily but investors must force it upon him in the initial period. However, such leverage is unsustainable since it is the manager who controls the debt level going forward, and he may issue equity to buy back debt, thus freeing him from discipline. Even in models in which the manager voluntarily chooses high leverage to signal in the initial period, he may have incentives to reverse leverage later. In such models, even though the manager dislikes discipline, he chooses high leverage to be able to raise funds, since debt either commits not to overinvest or signals quality. Once funds have been raised, the manager has incentives to delever. 22 Dynamic consistency issues occur in such papers because debt's only role is to act as either a signal (which is only valuable in the …rst period) or disciplining device (imposed by shareholders who only control leverage in the …rst period). Zwiebel was the …rst to present a dynamically consistent model of debt; he solves this issue by introducing a raider who is present in every period, and so it is individually rational for the manager to retain debt in every period. 23 Dividends would be equally e¤ective; the theory is a dynamically consistent model of total payout. This paper presents a dynamically consistent model of debt in particular, which arises from its two roles. The disciplinary e¤ect credibly signals high quality, but this signal is only relevant at t = 0, when funds are raised. If raising funds was the only goal, then immediately after funds were raised at t = 0, the manager would undo the signal and delever.
The concentration e¤ect gives the manager an ongoing incentive to maintain leverage. Unlike in traditional models where the bene…ts of signaling are obtained only at t = 0, here the bene…ts are earned at t = 2 in the form of monitoring. Delevering would reduce L's incentives to acquire information, thus preventing M from taking R if he becomes inspired. Dynamic consistency can be shown by giving the manager of a levered …rm the option to issue equity to repurchase debt and promise a dividend just after t = 0, once funds have already been raised. A repurchase of debt at t = 0 must be accompanied by a dividend promise, because any structure that does not involve risky debt reveals the manager as bad from part (iii) of Proposition 2. 24 From (49) and (50), investors will immediately terminate a bad manager at t = 0 unless he promises a dividend. By promising a dividend, a manager who delevers avoids being …red since the …rm remains viable (from (49)) and so the threat of …ring which leads to dynamic consistency in Zwiebel does not apply here. Instead, a good manager retains debt even in the absence of an external threat -he does so because of the desire to pursue internal growth opportunities. Delevering loses the concentration e¤ect of debt and so he will be unable to choose R if inspired. From (52) , this disadvantage outweighs the fact that delevering reduces the …ring probability if he turns out to be uninspired. Leverage is thus persistent, consistent with the empirical …ndings of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) .
Here, dynamic consistency arises because L plays a di¤erent role than in most existing literature. In e¤ort models where there is a con ‡ict between …rm value and the manager's utility function (e.g. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)), the manager dislikes monitors since they are an "adversary" and force him to exert e¤ort or forgo private bene…ts. Therefore, the manager would have incentives to deter L from monitoring by reducing leverage. Here, there is no fundamental con ‡ict between …rm value and private bene…ts, because the same project (R) maximizes both. Here, the monitor is an "ally", allowing the manager to continue operating if he is unlucky. Thus, the manager wishes to retain her through leverage.
As in Section 2, the importance of the concentration e¤ect means that strictly nonrepayable debt is optimal. If credibility is the only requirement for signaling, only the disciplinary e¤ect is important (since a bad manager wishes to avoid discipline) and so borderline nonrepayable debt is optimal to minimize signaling costs. However, for signaling to be desirable for good managers, debt must also lead to concentration. Also as in Section 2, the importance of the concentration e¤ect means that dividends are not a substitute for debt. This contrasts with the Ross (1977) signaling model where debt can signal high quality since bad …rms cannot meet the debt repayments: Bhattacharya (1979) shows that dividends can have the same e¤ect.
A …nal di¤erence with standard signaling models is that signaling can increase aggregate fundamental …rm value. In a pooling equilibrium where all …rms are unlevered and …nanced with dividends, a …rm run by a good manager delivers investor returns of
high, i.e. the termination and investment issues are su¢ ciently important, the returns generated by a good manager are higher in a separating equilibrium. This is because the separating equilibrium allows good managers to be monitored, which encourages them to take R and also leads to them being terminated with certainty (rather than probability ) if they become uninspired. The bad manager yields the same returns in both a pooling and separating equilibrium. This result contrasts with a number of classical signaling models (e.g. Ross (1977) , Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) , Stein (1989) ) where signaling only increases outsiders' perceptions of …rm value in the short-term; actual fundamental value falls because signaling is costly. (Moreover, since the increased perceived value of good …rms is accompanied by a reduced perceived value of bad …rms, even the short-run e¤ect is a redistribution rather than an aggregate increase.) In Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) , signaling can increase real value by allowing a …rm to raise funds and invest. Here, signaling has no e¤ect on the level of funds raised, since all managers raise I in both equilibria. Instead, the real bene…ts of signaling arise because it a¤ects the type of funds: scarce large investors are allocated to good managers, who bene…t most from monitoring. Note that the allocation of blockholders is di¤erent from that implied by traditional theories where they play a disciplinary role (e.g. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), Maug (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), Bolton and von Thadden (1998)) -these theories would predict that monitors should acquire stakes in bad …rms to correct agency problems. Here, the monitor is an "ally"of good managers rather than an "adversary"of bad managers, and so should be allocated to the former.
Applications and Empirical Implications
While Section 2.5 considered implications of the single-…rm model, this section discusses further implications generated by the extended model and applications of the separating equilibrium.
The extended model generates the broad implication that managers should willingly seek and retain leverage. In standard disciplinary theories (e.g. Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) ), leverage is imposed by investors in the initial period, but it is the manager who controls it going forward, and he has incentives to delever. Here, the manager wishes to retain debt as it leads to monitoring by an ally. This has both cross-sectional and time-series implications. First, the model is consistent with the widespread prevalence of debt in reality: if leverage were not dynamically consistent, only …rms that have just raised funds would be levered, and so the vast majority of …rms at a given time would have no debt. Second, in a given …rm, leverage should be persistent over time, as found by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) .
The core model predicts that debt is positively correlated with investment when total payout is controlled for, since it induces monitoring. The extended model provides another reason for this association -debt wards o¤ unskilled managers who are unable to innovate. Considering a single agent, Manso (2009) shows that tolerance of failure encourages innovation. This model shows an important counteracting e¤ect in the presence of heterogeneous agents -intolerance of failure through disciplinary debt may screen out low-quality agents who are unable to innovate.
We now turn to real-life applications of the separating equilibrium. Good managers take on risky debt and bad managers are unlevered; one interpretation is that the former corresponds to an LBO …rm and the latter to a public corporation with low leverage. 25 Unlike in some signaling theories, here the motive for high-quality managers to signal is not to obtain more funds. This is consistent with the fact that private …rms are typically smaller than public …rms. In addition, while traditional signaling models suggest that borderline nonrepayable debt is optimal so that the debt is just high enough so that a low type cannot pay it, in private equity the debt is strictly nonrepayable. The model also predicts that levered …rms should outperform standard corporations because they attract high-quality managers and allow them to invest optimally: L earns a strictly positive net return. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) …nd that private equity generates excess returns of 5-8% per year relative to public equity, and Kaplan and Schoar (2005) …nd that private equity …rms outperform the S&P (gross of fees). 26 Second, the model can be applied to analyze the capital structure of investment companies, the focus of Stein (2005) . The two fund types analyzed by Stein have natural analogs in this model. The closed-end fund is similar to the unlevered …rm with no dividends, which allows long-term investment but not liquidation. The open-end mutual fund is analogous to the unlevered …rm with dividends: open-ending allows liquidation through permitting investor withdrawals, but at the expense of deterring long-term arbitrage trades. The levered structure is not considered by Stein. The analogy is hedge funds: leverage allows hedge funds to undertake risky arbitrage trades, but also deters bad managers from establishing such funds as they will likely be terminated. Indeed, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) …nd that the average hedge fund consistently outperforms mutual funds, even after risk and fees.
Conclusion
This paper addresses a fundamental dilemma in corporate governance: how can investors ensure that bad managers are terminated, without inducing good managers to take myopic actions to avoid termination? Equity …nancing without dividends allows investment but prevents optimal shut-down; promising dividends achieves termination but at the expense of myopia.
We show that debt can alleviate this tension by concentrating equityholders'stakes and thus inducing monitoring. Monitoring is desirable even absent an e¤ort con ‡ict as it allows investment. As a result, debt is superior to other disciplinary mechanisms that achieve termination, such as dividends, as it does not su¤er the side-e¤ect of inducing myopia. In addition, strictly nonrepayable debt is optimal because it increases concentration. 25 The model complements existing justi…cations for the debt-…nancing of buyouts. One reason is that debt imposes discipline (Jensen (1989) ); however, as argued previously, this e¤ect may also be achieved by equity…nancing acquisitions and demanding high dividends. Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach's (2009) explanation is based on agency problems between fund managers and fund investors, rather than between fund managers and operating company managers. 26 While buyouts usually do not retain their high leverage permanently, leverage typically remains signi…cantly above the pre-buyout level (Kaplan (1991) ). In addition, delevering is achieved through selling assets, rather than raising equity and diluting ownership. As assets are sold, the issue of ine¢ cient continuation in non-core businesses is reduced; this reduces the optimal level of total payout and is consistent with the fall in debt.
The monitoring induced by leverage allows a separating equilibrium to be sustainable: good managers are willing to signal quality by assuming debt. Even though signaling does not lead to more initial funds, and the manager is not aligned to the …rm's market value, a good manager has an incentive to signal to attract a di¤erent type of funds: active monitors, who allow him to undertake long-term projects. Once the signal has been given and …nancing has been raised, the manager has continued incentives to maintain leverage and thus a concentrated monitor.
While existing empirical studies investigate the determinants of total leverage, this paper suggests new avenues for future empirical work: breaking down leverage into total payout, and the proportion of payout in debt as opposed to dividends. Where the termination issue is unimportant (such as early stage …rms), total payout should be low and the …rm should feature neither debt nor dividends. Where both termination and investment are important, total payout should be high and in the form of debt rather than dividends. The conventional wisdom that debt is detrimental to growth may be overturned when levered companies are compared not to unlevered peers, but peers that pay out the same amount of cash in the form of dividends to overcome a termination problem. This prediction is consistent with the recent wave of LBOs, which are concentrated in middle-aged …rms in industries with growth opportunities, and so the goal is to curb wasteful projects without deterring e¢ cient investment. 
Note that
Fix the values of all of the parameters except c , and then choose a value for c such that (34) is satis…ed at the upper bound of F given above. Then (40), (42) and (58) can be satis…ed as long as c and x is small (so and I D are also small). Thus the set of parameters satisfying all of the conditions is non-empty.
B Incentive Pay
This section shows that the model's results are robust to replacing the manager's private bene…ts with incentive pay. So that the manager's pay is una¤ected by the …rm's leverage, we compensate him with a fraction of the …rm's assets (rather than equity alone) and assume that his pay is senior to creditors. If pay depended on equity or was junior to creditors, pay would be reduced by increasing leverage and so the capital structure decision would be distorted by the desire to increase or decrease the manager's pay. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Wei and Yermack (2010) show that managers are compensated with debt as well as equity, and Calcagno and Renneboog (2007) cite bankruptcy regulations in certain countries (e.g. US, UK and Germany) that management can use to ensure that salaries are senior to creditors in a bankruptcy, and give a number of examples where this occurred. For each period after t = 1 that the manager is employed by the …rm, he receives a fraction of the …nal …rm value. Thus, he receives V 2 if it is liquidated at t = 2, and 2 V 3 if it is continued until t = 3. It is necessary for the fraction of assets received by the manager to increase with tenure (from to 2 ) to create a termination issue, i.e. give him an incentive to continue the …rm even if he is uninspired. Otherwise, an uninspired manager would voluntarily liquidate the …rm. In reality, managers are given additional equity compensation for each extra year they work; Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Cremers and Palia (2010) …nd that a manager's equity alignment is increasing in his tenure, and Sundaram and Yermack (2007) …nd the same for a manager's debt stakes. Note that we do not consider giving the manager an optimal incentive contract. This is standard in models with a termination issue (e.g. Stulz (1990) , Diamond (1991 Diamond ( , 1993 , Zwiebel (1996) , where the manager receives private bene…ts that increase with his tenure) or an investment issue (e.g. Stein (1988) , where the manager is exogenously aligned with short-term earnings) -if it were possible to write an optimal contract that aligned the manager perfectly with …rm value, all agency problems would disappear and there would be no need for external monitoring. Agency problems exist in reality since they may be too large to address with a contract -for example, myopic actions and entrenchment were severe in the recent …nancial crisis despite managers having substantial incentive pay (see, e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) .). The problem of solving agency issues through contracting rather than monitoring is a separate question studied by a di¤erent literature. In particular, we show that it is not necessary to write an optimal contract to solve the manager's agency problem -inducing investor monitoring (i.e. solving the investor's agency problem) is su¢ cient.
With the manager receiving a fraction of the …rm's assets that increases in his tenure, the payo¤s in Table 1 now become (using b now to denote the manager's pay):
U with probability ; K S w.p. 1
The analysis is very similar to the main paper. We …rst start by assuming no monitoring technology, as in Section 2.1. In the absence of a disciplinary payment, the condition for all shareholders to wish the …rm to continue at t = 2 (equation (8)) becomes:
and the payo¤ to investors (equation (9)) is
As before, investors make a loss (from (7)) and so will not …nance the …rm to begin with. 27 Thus, Lemma 1 continues to hold. With a disciplinary payment, the conditions for Lemma 2 (equations (10)- (11)) become:
and the payo¤ to investors (equation (12)) is
(1 2 ) V S + (1 ) (1 ) K U . 27 Indeed, in the presence of incentive compensation, (7) can be weakened to (1 2 ) V R + (1 ) V U < I, although this is not necessary.
As before, investors make a loss (from (6) ) and so will not …nance the …rm to begin with. 28 Thus, Lemma 2 continues to hold.
With contractible monitoring and no disciplinary payment, Lemma 3 continues to hold and the expected gross returns to L, all households and the manager are given by:
If a disciplinary payment is required, an inspired manager will choose R if the following analog of (15) is satis…ed:
As in the core model, this inequality is fully consistent with (60): in the presence of a disciplinary payment, monitoring is necessary and su¢ cient to encourage M to choose R. Lemma 4 continues to hold and the payo¤s are given by:
With non-contractible monitoring and risky debt (Section 2.3.1), creditors liquidate (the equivalent of (26)) if 
As in the core model, (61) > x is consistent with (6) and (7), so the …rm may be viable. 28 Indeed, in the presence of incentive compensation, (6) can be weakened to (1 2 ) V S + (1 ) (1 ) K U < I.
The market value of debt (31) and its upper and lower bounds for debt, ( (32) and (33)) are and so the condition for risky debt to induce monitoring, (34) , is
The marginal e¤ect of increasing F on L's incentive to monitor, (35) is
which is positive if (61) > x, i.e. the …rm is viable. Turning to repayable debt (Section 2.3.2), the condition for L to monitor, (36), becomes
Lemma 6 continues to hold and the payo¤s are given by:
However, L will not monitor under repayable debt if the following analog of (40) holds:
(1 )
With riskless debt plus a dividend, the condition for L to monitor, (41), becomes
and monitoring is impossible if the following analog of (42) holds:
Thus, if (62), (64) and (65) hold, and (61) > x, then risky debt is the only viable …nancing structure (the analog of Proposition 1.) To prove that the set of parameters satisfying these conditions is non-empty, as in the proof of Proposition 1 we only need to consider the case 
We …rst take x = 0. The LHS of (64) and (65) are zero, so for any positive c, (64) and (65) trivially hold. Now we just need to set c 2 (0; 1 + (1 2 ) V R F ) to make (62) hold. When c is su¢ ciently small (so that is also small but c is …xed), (66) holds. Since all inequalities are strict and all functions are continuous, there existsx 2 (0; 1) such that for all x 2 (0;x), all conditions hold. Finally, for the extension to heterogeneous managers, Section 3, conditions (49)- (51) become:
( 1 2 ) 1
The su¢ cient conditions for a separating equilibrium, (52) and (53), are now:
The returns to investors in a levered …rm, a good manager, and a bad manager ((54)-(56)) are respectively given by:
L will monitor at t = 2 if
which can always be satis…ed from G > and (62).
